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The event: a process ontological concept  
to understand emergent phenomena
Tilman Hertz, Maria Mancilla Garcia
Discussions about emergence have traditionally 
been structured around the dichotomy between 
strong (ontological) and weak (epistemological) 
emergence. Those focusing on emergence as an 
epistemological problem, understand it as meta-
physically innocent, indicating an insufficient (per-
haps temporarily so) knowledge of the world. 
Ontological emergence, on the other hand, admits 
new levels of reality and causal powers. It empha-
sizes that emergence is incompatible with reduc-
tionism. This position has faced the problem of 
dealing with explanatory gaps, and accusations of 
having recourse to esoteric forces to overcome 
such gaps. This paper explores the possibilities 
offered by process philosophy - where the nature 
of reality is one in which becoming has priority 
over being - to redefine emergence. From a process 
perspective, emergence has an ontological dimen-
sion in which that it may entail new causal powers, 
but this does not mean that emergent phenomena 
cannot be explained or understood. By focusing on 
the key process concept of the Event, we investi-
gate emergence as an onto-epistemological expe-
rience. Building on the Deleuzian work on the 
assemblage and on the Jamesian concept of expe-
rience, we show that organization needs to be 
understood as the locus of causality in emergent 
phenomena. We present abduction, which gives 
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room for intuition, imagination and speculation, as 
the ground to develop knowledge coherent with 
this perspective.
PROCESS ONTOLOGY EVENT 
ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGY RELATION EXPERIENCE
*We would like to thank Maja Schlüter for her help and comments to improve this manuscript.  This project has 
received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research 
and innovation programme (grant agreement No 682472 — MUSES) and a core grant to the Stockholm Resilience 
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Introduction 
Discussions around emergence abound in philosophy of science. At the heart of these 
discussions lies the question as to whether or not anything can be said to emerge, 
i.e. whether anything truly novel and endowed with causal potency can appear or 
whether all phenomena are attributable to the properties of fundamental entities. The 
appearance of such causally potent phenomena has also been referred to as “strong 
emergence”, as opposed to the so-called “weak emergence” in which what emerges 
might be epistemologically novel (for instance unpredictable or surprising) but not 
ontologically novel nor causally potent. Following Chalmers (2006) we make the dis-
tinction between weak and strong emergence as follows: «A high-level phenomenon 
is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phe-
nomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenome-
non are not deducible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain. [...] We 
can say that a high-level phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a low-lev-
el domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but 
truths concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing 
the low-level domain» (2006, 244-245). In this paper we will disentangle the impli-
cations such an understanding of emergence has for causality, especially with respect 
to notions such as “upward” and “downward” causation. 
In particular, we will argue that the distinction between weak and strong 
emergence is made on the basis of a fundamental assumption, notably that there is 
a distinction between ontology and epistemology. This distinction has been consid-
ered by process philosophers such as Whitehead (2006), Latour (2005), and Stengers 
(2000) as a bifurcation, i.e. a non-necessary separation the utility of which process 
philosophers question. This bifurcation, between how reality is and how it is appre-
hended, paves the way for a type of thinking that allows for reference to fundamen-
tal elements, or ultimate building blocks of reality (Latour 2011), such as substances. 
We will argue below that such a bifurcation invites/imposes an explanatory scheme 
where an emergent phenomenon is (or rather needs to be, in principle) explained 
in terms of the properties of those building blocks or substances (or interaction of 
thereof). A key tenet to this view, according to Santos (2015), is that “no elemen-
tary entity or compound system can qualitatively change its identity, that is, to ac-
quire and lose properties, through their extrinsic relations”. This means that it is “in” 
those fundamental elements where one needs to look for the locus of causal power 
that is necessary to achieve a thorough knowledge of emergent phenomena. Hence, 
this leaves two possibilities for explaining emergence as already sketched out by 
Chalmers (2006) above: Either reducing/explaining it in terms of those fundamental 
elements 1 or facing an explanatory gap in that causal 
capacities of emergent phenomena might not be able to 
be reduced to, or explained in terms of such elements. 
However, in this paper we side with Bunge in 
arguing that the «possibility of analysis does not entail 
reduction, and explanation of the mechanisms of emer-
gence does not explain emergence away» (1979, 156). 
We propose to go beyond the distinction between epis-
temology and ontology towards an onto-epistemology. 
We do this through the concept of experience as understood by William James, which 
has both an ontological and an epistemological dimension. This allows us to propose 
an alternative account of emergence and with it a different way of conceptualizing 
1 We follow Epstein (1999) who 
notes that unpredictability does not 
mean non-deductibility. In other 
words, just because something 
might be unexpected as a result 
of it being unpredictable does not 
mean that it cannot be explained a 
posteriori and hence, in the widest 
sense deducible.
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novelty and causal potency. Emergence, we argue, could be understood as the prop-
erty of an arrangement, inspired in the Deleuzian defi-
nition of the assemblage 2 (Deleuze & Guattari, 1975), 
where the act of experiencing actualizes an emergent 
property. This means that emergence is real because 
experience is real. This does not entail embracing a sub-
jectivist account of reality nor an idealist one. Instead, 
we position ourselves as realists, offering a redefini-
tion of what is traditionally meant by objectivity. The 
question “emergence for whom” becomes a central one. 
Objectivity is thus a property of the assemblage, not 
a mind (and experience) independent property in the 
framework of a bifurcated reality.  
Strong and weak emergence: main con-
troversies
inherent in Chalmer’s (2006) characterization of emer-
gence are assumptions about the “locus” of causality, i.e. 
about the appropriate level to be focused on in the anal-
ysis of the emergence of such phenomena (Campbell & 
Bickhard 2011). Weakly emergent phenomena are de-
fined as arising from the low-level domain and, albeit unexpected, are deducible from 
and reducible to this lower level. Strongly emergent phenomena are those that arise 
from the lower level but are not deducible (not even in principle) from that level, and 
are ontologically novel. 
In the first case, the locus of causality is “in” what constitutes the lower lev-
el, which is said to be foundational. What constitutes the lower level is often atomistic 
in nature, e.g. entities/things like particles, substances, states of affairs which are en-
dowed with a set of qualitatively immutable properties (Santos 2015). If they are the 
most fundamental elements, then they need to be qualitatively immutable. In other 
words, these atomistic elements have sharp (conceptual) boundaries (Santos 2015). 
What is more, from the point of view of weak emergence, “organization” cannot be 
considered a locus of causality. We follow Bickhard and Campbell when they say that 
if one assumes the existence of fundamental entities, organization is necessarily sec-
ondary, «a boundary condition, with no causal power of its own» (2011, 47). By con-
trast, with respect to strong emergence, the locus of causality is to be found in the 
emergent phenomena itself, without it being explainable in terms of (and reducible 
to) what gave rise to it. This is what has led many authors and scholars to qualify this 
account as mysterious and unscientific (see Epstein, 1999). Protevi summarizes the 
discussion well when he notes: 
The focus on the part / whole relation of synchronic emergence has caused a lot of mischief 
in social science with the structure / agency dilemma, and in philosophy of mind with the en-
tire range of problems surrounding the issues of physicalism, eliminative materialism, reduc-
tionism, supervenience, and so forth. We see a curious chiasmatic relation here. In conscious-
ness issues, researchers operating without a notion of complex systems struggle to relate the 
global level of freedom (the mental whole) to the local determinism of physical parts, while in 
social science they struggle to relate the local freedom of individual agents (parts) to the glob-
al determinism of social structure (the whole). The relation of methodological individualism 
2 An assemblage, as inspired by 
the works of Deleuze and Guattari 
(1975), is a collection of elements 
that come together for a capacity 
to affect that could not be realized 
without the assemblage. Nail (2017) 
elaborates «In contrast to organic 
unities, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
assemblages are more like machi-
nes, defined solely by their external 
relations of composition mixture, 
and aggregation. In other words, an 
assemblage is a multiplicity, nei-
ther a part nor a whole. If the ele-
ments of an assemblage are defi-
ned only by their external relations, 
then it is possible that they can be 
added, subtracted, and recombi-
ned with one another ad infinitum 
without ever creating or destroying 
an organic unity» The elements of 
an assemblage can be radically dif-
ferent and encompass material and 
immaterial dimensions alike. It is 
that capacity to affect, as the pro-
perty of an assemblage that we 
take to be an emergent property.
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in social science to genetic reductionism in biology is not chiasmatic however, but analogic. 
Genetic reductionism is analogous to methodological individualism in that all living or social 
phenomena are considered mere epi-phenomena of fundamental units (genes or agents); in 
other words, these stances accept only ‘upward causality’. (Protevi 2006, 24-25)
We argue that approaching the issue of emergence in such way assumes that there 
is a reality (ontology) that pre-exists experience of it and awaits discovery in the 
framework of epistemological activity. In this context, Bruno Latour, in the tradition 
of A.N. Whitehead (2006), refers to the bifurcation of nature which he defines as: 
what happens whenever we think the world is divided into two sets of things: one which is 
composed of the fundamental constituents of the universe— invisible to the eyes, known to 
science, yet real and valueless—and the other which is constituted of what the mind has to 
add to the basic building blocks of the world in order to make sense of them (2011).
Epistemological activity is thus reduced to the activity of discovering that which 
pre-exists the apprehension of the “real” - which might take the form of matter (as 
in eliminative materialism) or individuals (as in methodological individualism) as il-
lustrated in Protevi’s (2006) quote above. May (2005) notes that the legacy of sub-
stance ontologies is still strong in western science. There is thus a tendency to con-
sider substances as real, and this tendency underpins significant areas of scientific 
practice. Consequently, substance ontologies have significantly shaped discussions 
around emergence. More generally, the important point to take away is that expla-
nations of emergent phenomena are tied to whatever is defined as the “real”, and 
subsequently needs to be explained in terms of whatever one deems to be real, dis-
regarding how it is apprehended. This limits our possibilities of explaining and under-
standing emergent phenomena, especially when what is real are substances with de-
fined conceptual boundaries and properties. 
I. Being as events of experience
as it has been extensively argued, modernity, and in particular the work of Descartes, 
laid the seeds for the dominance of substance-biased ontologies (see for example 
Debaise, 2017 for a discussion and references). Substance-biased conceptualizations - 
be it physicalism, idealism, etc. - build on the fundamental bifurcations that Descartes 
introduced: the mind is separate from the body and nature is separate from culture. 
Process philosophers have extensively denounced the flaws in such bifurcated view 
of reality and have embraced a conceptualization of the world as made of ever evolv-
ing relations, or processes that are captured in events. We argue in this paper that 
conceptualizing emergence from a process perspective allows to overcome both the 
threats of reductionism and of explanatory gaps when accounting for emergent 
phenomena.  
I.1. Being understood as Events 
Process ontologies base all conceptual developments from the concept of becoming: 
Becoming precedes being. From a process ontological perspective, reality does not 
consist of immutable and unchanging beings. Beings are just temporal manifestations 
of stabilized processes and only secondarily, a derivative of a reality in constant flux. 
We can think of temporal manifestations of stabilized processes as spatio-temporal 
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events. Therefore, saying that reality is made of processes equals saying that reality 
consists of events which are, according to Whitehead (1978), «the final real things of 
which the world is made up» (18). 
Whitehead defines events as «chunks in the life of nature» which simply 
refer to the «experience of activity (or passage)» (2006, 218). Hynes (2016) consid-
ers an event to be an “actualization of forces” and as such, it can be taken as an onto-
logical unit. In order to better understand what comes to constitute an event, we turn 
to the concept of “immanence” that Deleuze and his co-author Félix Guattari put for-
ward (2002). The plane of immanence supposes that forces exist as possibilities, as 
potentials of which some are actualized through mechanisms that are not transcend-
ent to what gave rise to them in the first place - in other words, what will actualize 
will not depend on essences and principles but is immanent to the event itself, simply 
because the event carries all possibilities of its future unfolding within itself. 
It is when going from an indeterminacy of the possible, which refers to the 
space of possibilities open at any given moment, to a determinacy in the actualiza-
tion of an event that the notion of “process” applies. The event is one singular actual-
ization of forces, which can be determined in multiple ways. In other words, the ac-
tualization of forces does not happen according to any predefined necessary pattern 
but is defined by the event. Indeed, process ontologies are characterized by rhizom-
atic dynamics (Deleuze & Guattari 2014) which can be referred to as the principles 
according to which the becoming of the event unfolds. Rhizomatic dynamics evoke 
a metaphor in contrast with arborescent and hierarchical images, including multiple 
entry points and influences following which a being may unfold. Every actualization 
reconfigures/restructures the possible, because the possibilities of unfolding via actu-
alization change continuously. 
I.2. Events are experiences 
How do we access events? How do we determine them? What “are” they? The short 
answer is that events are experiences (Whitehead 1978). An event is a unit of expe-
rience that is grasped by what we will call a center of experience (a term coined by 
Debaise 2017). Therefore, we follow James (1904) and readers such as Debaise (2017) 
arguing that being is experience. Being is to be understood in terms of events which 
are concrete experiences in space and time. From this perspective, the manner of ex-
perience - i.e. conscious or unconscious, mental or sensory - is irrelevant, nor is it rel-
evant who or what experiences (Mesle 2008). As such the activity of experiencing 
goes far beyond the human, or animate realm (see table 1). Debaise notes that feeling 
(as experience) is the most fundamental or «primary activity [operation] of all exist-
ence» (Debaise 2017, 53). “Experience” is defined, following Whitehead, as a form of 
apprehending being. A process (or processes) that is (are) realized as an event simply 
is an experience actualized in a center of experience. According to this scheme, the 
center of experience is thus an integral part of the event to realize. 
It is through experiencing events that one creates abstractions, i.e. concepts 
that allow to refer to particular experiences. If epistemological practice refers to the 
practice of making useful abstractions on the basis of our experience, and if reality 
itself is constituted out of experience, then “experience” has both an epistemological 
and an ontological dimension. From a process ontological perspective, epistemology 
and ontology are thus inextricably linked. We follow Karen Barad on her challenge of 
the separation between epistemology and ontology: 
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We do not obtain knowledge by standing outside of the world; we know because “we” are part 
of the world. […] The separation of epistemology from ontology is a reverberation of a met-
aphysics that assumes an inherent difference between human and nonhuman, subject and 
object, mind and body, matter and discourse (2007, 185).
According to process thinkers, there is no pre-existing “entity” like the human sub-
ject as the vehicle of knowing. Joan Scott argues, for example, that the human sub-
ject should not be taken as given, but thought of as constituted through experience 
(1992). A human subject is not a fixed substance that experiences an exterior world. 
Hence, what a human subject, or rather, a subjectivity, refers to is the activity of ex-
periencing. This, according to Whitehead, applies to micro-organisms as much as it 
does to humans, the two differing only in how they can experience, not that they ex-
perience (i.e. different manners of experience). Debaise notes that: 
It is as if the universe ceaselessly contracts into a multiplicity of points that are so many 
centers of experience [subjects], perspectives of all that exists. It is important to note that 
these perspectives are not perspectives on the universe but perspectives of the universe, im-
manent to it (2017, 51).
These different perspectives of the universe derive from the fact that every experi-
encer experiences from a particular standpoint, out of a particular history, from a 
particular embeddedness in space and time. In other words, different centers of ex-
perience have different conditions of experience. However, the onto-epistemological 
account does not commit us to any form of subjective relativism. Deleuze’s defini-
tion of perspectivism allows us to bridge this apparent tension between particularity 
and realism: «perspectivism amounts to a relativism, but not the relativism we take 
for granted. It is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in 
which the truth of a variation appears to the subject» (1993, 20).
To sum up the previous two sections, existence (as events) is dependent on 
being experienced. What an event is can only be explained in terms of what it consists 
of, that is, in terms of other events it has incorporated, a process which, metaphori-
cally speaking, occurs via rhizomatic and not arborescent dynamics. This means that 
nothing is more fundamental than anything else and can only be explained through 
mutual reference; in a certain sense, every event mirrors the world from its own 
unique perspective (see Hooper 1947). This is because an event simply is all the oth-
er events it has appropriated or incorporated in its ongoing actualization or unfold-
ing. This carries two consequences: firstly, events have fuzzy boundaries, i.e. they can-
not be captured by a definite set of properties alike substances because they are fully 
composed of other events in a process of continuous unfolding where new events en-
ter continuously; secondly, from a process ontological perspective, we need to abolish 
the distinction between epistemology and ontology because the act of experiencing, 
an epistemological activity, is at the same time an ontological activity (see table 1).
Event The most basic ontological category. It can be abstracted because it is experienced 
as a unit that can be distinguished as such - by a center of experience - from a wor-
ld in constant process. Yet, it has fuzzy conceptual boundaries since it is made of 
other events.
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Process Processes are that which bring about events. A single event can be realized by many 
different processes coming from a variety of different realms, such as the biological, 
the ecological, the social, the cultural, the aesthetic, etc.
Experience In experience the processes that bring about events are disclosed and abstracted. 
Not all possible processes that could enter an event are always experienced. Which 
processes are experienced depend on the conditions of experience.
Conditions 
of experience
Conditions which allow a center of experience to have an affecting experience. 
Examples are: the presence or absence of a nervous system (conscious or uncon-
scious experience) or a particular context (i.e. a position in space and time), or ha-
ving or not a language at one’s disposal (for example, having a conceptual language 
allows for transmission of events via a conversation or a book) etc.
Center 
of Experience
That which experiences. Centers of experience can be very different, given that 
experience is not limited to a human faculty. Human, conscious experience is just 
one way of experiencing, next to other, unconscious ones.
Possibility 
space
The set of processes and their interactions that are possible. The possibility space 
changes as processes actualize and change in interaction with other processes. It re-
cords events and contains them and is modified by random events. The possibility of 
those events occurring is one of the characteristics of the possibility space.
II. EMERGENCE FROM A PROCESS ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Two implications for emergence: organization matters and need  
of an experiencer to exist
II.1. Organization matters 
As indicated above, the boundaries of the event are fuzzy. Thus, explaining emergent 
phenomena - which are events themselves - in terms of other events with fuzzy 
boundaries puts emphasis on the concrete processes 
that bring the emergent phenomena about. 3 In other 
words, the locus of causality lies in the particular or-
ganization of processes that generate emergent phe-
nomena at any given moment. Process thinkers such 
as Deleuze and Guattari talk about assemblages of pro-
cesses to characterize emergent phenomena. 
Table 1 Definitions (based on 
works by Whitehead 1925, Deleuze 
and Guattari 2002)
3 Saying that an emergent phe-
nomenon is an event that can be 
understood in terms of other events 
is, in the end, just another way of 
stating that emergence is the pro-
perty of an assemblage (see the 
introduction to this paper) 
P
hi
lo
so
ph
y 
K
it
ch
en
 #
11
 —
 A
nn
o
 7
 —
 S
et
te
m
br
e 
20
19
 —
 IS
S
N
: 2
38
5-
19
45
 —
 P
ar
ti
, i
ns
ie
m
i e
 s
is
te
m
i. 
Il
 c
on
ce
tt
o
 d
i e
m
er
g
en
za
 in
 fi
lo
so
fi
a
 219
T
he event: a process ontolog
ical concept  to
 understand
 em
erg
ent phenom
ena —
 T
ilm
an
 H
ertz, M
aria M
ancilla G
arcia
To illustrate the process conceptualization of emergence, let’s turn to the 
well-studied Balinese water management temples (Lansing 1987 and 2003; Lansing 
& De Vet 2012). Those temples and the rituals around them are organized into an 
emergent, highly complex crop-management system. We will define such system as 
an assemblage of processes in which the rotation of crops not only allows efficient 
shared irrigation practices but also pest management control. Management is at the 
same time the result of and shaped by a «process of coadaptation on a rugged fit-
ness landscape» (Lansing & Kremer 1993, 99). This process of coadaptation should 
be understood as continuously evolving in time and space and involving farmers, eco-
logical systems, cultural practices, and the physical geography of Bali. Put different-
ly, what these individual components are, and why they do what they do, cannot be 
understood without reference to this very process of co-adaptation that changes 
these same components along the way. In this sense, the emergent property - the 
highly complex crop management system - is not something that pre-exists the re-
lation between the individual components. Put differently, it cannot be said to be the 
result of a simple aggregation or combination of pre-existing components precise-
ly because these components are changed by the very process of co-adaptation. This 
continuous co-adaptation among individual components can be understood in terms 
of evolving possibility spaces (defined by the plane of immanence at any moment) 
in the framework of which novel relations actualize as processes. The properties of 
emergent phenomena simply lie within those actualized processes that define such 
assemblages. In other words, it is because the particular relations between the farm-
ers, ecological systems, cultural practices, and the physical geography of Bali are ac-
tualized by the processes of continuous co-adaptation that the emergent property 
(crop-management system) realizes.
Holding that true, we neither have essences that would be the locus of up-
ward causation, nor do we have some kind of whole that would “do” the downward 
causation. We side with Santos when he notes that:
Therefore, we can preserve the meaning of both upward (UC) and DC [upward and downward 
causation] without assuming the existence of causes that ‘‘go up’’ and ‘‘go down’’ between 
parts and wholes. UC and DC must be conceived as two different aspects of the same ongo-
ing intra-level process of systemic relational causation between different relata that belong 
to the same relational domain. (2015, 28)
Another way of putting this is to re-emphasize that relations which are actualized 
as processes modify the possibility spaces of events. It is precisely in terms of this 
modification of the possibility spaces that upward and downward causation have to 
be understood. This modification influences what an assemblage, understood as an 
event, can and cannot do. Thus, we can think of UC and DC without thinking that ei-
ther wholes or parts do the job but rather think of them in terms of actualized rela-
tions that modify the possibility space of events.
II.2. Emergence needs an experiencer
The fact that events are units of experience implies that for emergent phenomena to 
exist it requires to be experienced. In other words, the fact that emergence requires 
an experiencer implies that emergence is a property of an event, which, in turn, is in-
separable from a center of experience. This contrasts with a layered view of reality, 
since from a process perspective, emergent phenomena do not exist independent of 
P
hi
lo
so
ph
y 
K
it
ch
en
 #
11
 —
 A
nn
o
 7
 —
 S
et
te
m
br
e 
20
19
 —
 IS
S
N
: 2
38
5-
19
45
 —
 P
ar
ti
, i
ns
ie
m
i e
 s
is
te
m
i. 
Il
 c
on
ce
tt
o
 d
i e
m
er
g
en
za
 in
 fi
lo
so
fi
a
 220
T
he event: a process ontolog
ical concept  to
 understand
 em
erg
ent phenom
ena —
 T
ilm
an
 H
ertz, M
aria M
ancilla G
arcia
an experiencer. We can therefore not answer the question about emergence with-
out asking at the same time the question about emergence for whom. Taking the 
example of the water temples above, we can say that for the human farmer, or for 
the scientist who investigates, and in accordance with their respective conditions 
of experience, the process presents itself as one process organizing interactions of 
components into a functional structure that is a highly complex crop-management 
system. 
This process has two dimensions: how the interaction of the components 
leads to the functional structure as well as how the functional structure impacts 
on the components. Highlighting those two dimensions is important because oth-
erwise one could not make a difference between, on the one hand, emergence and, 
an encounter/interaction on the other hand. An encounter of two assemblages may 
modify a possibility space but does not necessarily count as what has been defined 
as emergence - which involves that encounters/interactions lead to new function-
al structures that themselves impact on the possibility space of the entities involved.
II.3. Organization and Experience mutually determine each other
To fully grasp the scope of an onto-epistemology it is necessary to elaborate on the 
mutual determination of processes which realize organization on the one hand, and 
on experience of those very processes on the other hand. These processes, and the 
organization they realize, only have their given causal powers because they are ex-
perienced. Experience and processes are two dimensions of the same thing in an on-
going process of unfolding which is defined by the interplay of what is possible and 
what is actualized. In other words, experience organizes processes into events, but 
at the same time those very processes determine the possibilities for subsequent 
experience. 
III. Abductive methods from complexity sciences  
to further our understanding of emergent phenomena 
process ontologies have been proposed as foundations for complexity science 
(Weinbaum 2015; Holland 2013; Protevi 2006), which suggests that methods used 
in complexity science might be appropriate to tackle emergence from a process-re-
lational perspective. As an example, see Preiser et al. (2018), who comprehensively 
identify appropriate methods for furthering our capacity to analyze complex sys-
tems. It is striking to note that to a large extent these methods are abductive in nature. 
Abduction, as a form of reasoning, was proposed by the American prag-
matism philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1994) as a third form of reasoning next 
to induction and deduction. The latter two have been criticized by process philoso-
phers, such as Whitehead, as not allowing novelty to enter the line/chain of reasoning. 
Indeed, induction and deduction have been criticized by process thinkers as too rigid 
since they both begin with reference to something pre-existing. We follow Shaviro 
(2015, online) in his summary of the issue:
Deduction starts with conditions that are already given, and traces out a chain of logical con-
sequences for those conditions. Induction, for its part, generalizes on the basis of an already 
given set of particular observations. According to Peirce, neither deduction nor induction can 
actually suggest anything new. 
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Inductive and deductive forms of reasoning have been used to analyze emergent phe-
nomena on the basis of substance ontologies. Instead, Whitehead insists that there 
needs to be room for «the play of a free imagination, controlled by the requirements 
of coherence and logic» (1978, 5) in a process perspective because otherwise one is 
bound to miss the process of the unfolding of the event according to rhizomatic dy-
namics. This needs speculative activity. Shaviro (2015) is among those authors who 
see the Whiteheadian call for speculation in scientific activity akin to the Peirceian 
abduction. What the call for speculation does is to reverse the order of reasoning. It 
focuses on phenomena and speculates as to what brought them up, thus allowing 
change, interaction and thus true novelty to enter the process of scientific discovery. 
IV. Conclusion 
weak emergence entails reductionism where the causal potency of an emergent phe-
nomena can in principle be explained in terms of the elements of the lower level (or 
interaction thereof). Strong emergence has been condemned as entailing explanato-
ry gaps where the causal capacity of the emergent phenomena cannot be explained 
in terms of the lower level elements (or interaction thereof). The onto-epistemologi-
cal point of view, which situates the locus of causality in the relations between com-
ponents of an assemblage, allows us to side with Bunge in saying that the «possibility 
of analysis does not entail reduction, and explanation of the mechanisms of emer-
gence does not explain emergence away» (1979, 156). 
Saying that emergence is the property of an event equals to saying that 
something is emergent because it is abstracted as an event. From an onto-epistemo-
logical perspective, this does not entail reduction because an event simply IS defined 
by other events it has integrated in the process of abstraction. This means that it can-
not be reduced to something more fundamental because it can only be understood 
by reference to other events. There is nothing to what a particular being or an entity 
(or set of beliefs for that matter) can ultimately be reduced to except events of expe-
riences but which are mutually conditioning, presupposing, constituting, explaining 
etc. each other (see Latour 2005, 72). This is because all experiences are equally im-
portant, and none is more “real” than others (James, 1904; Duvernoy 2016).
This also means that the onto-epistemological position does not entail an 
explanatory gap when accounting for strong emergence. There are two reasons for 
this: First, because the onto-epistemological position abolishes bifurcations. When it 
comes to the explanation of an emergent phenomena, one is freed from having to ex-
plain it in terms of particular experiences (such as those conveyed by primary quali-
ties). Second and more importantly, entities, understood as events, evolve according 
to rhizomatic dynamics and acquire new properties and capacities by entering novel 
relations and laying thus a fundament for a type of novelty that is akin to algorithmic 
understandings of novelty (Arthur 2011).  
Emergence is a property of the event, and of the center of experience that 
experiences it. This opens up the possibility that emergent phenomena can exist for 
some, but not for others, but that doesn’t make the phenomena less real - which cer-
tainly goes beyond reducing them to mere epistemological differences and further 
develops the Deleuzian idea of perspectivism. As such, we have argued here that in-
vestigating emergence involves dwelling in those differences and to follow them by 
the use of, for example, abductive methods.
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